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SURVIVING THE SHIPWRECK: A PROPOSAL TO REVIVE
THE FAILING DIVISION DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division
of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) evaluate the
legality of certain proposed mergers by a set of self-imposed
standards known as the Merger Guidelines.1 The Merger
Guidelines outline two absolute defenses to pre-merger enforcement
actions brought by the FTC and DOJ (collectively "the agencies")
based on the merging parties' financial condition-the failing
company defense and the failing division defense.2 The failing
company and failing division defenses permit qualifying merging
parties to consummate proposed mergers involving failing assets,
even if the transactions are anticompetitive in violation of federal
antitrust laws.' A successful application of the failing company
defense requires that a company (1) is "unable to meet its financial
obligations in the near future,"' (2) is unable "to reorganize
successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act,"' (3) make
unsuccessful good faith efforts to locate less-anticompetitive
purchasers, and (4) absent the merger, the assets of the company
"would exit the relevant market."7 The requirements of the failing
division defense are similar to those of the failing company defense,
1. AM. BARAss'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-
BY-STEP GUIDE TO FEDERAL ANTITRUST MERGER REVIEW 2 (Ilene K. Gotts ed. 2001)
[hereinafter THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS].
2. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104, at §§ 5.0-5.2 (Apr.
8, 1997) [hereinafter 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines]. Textual references to the Merger
Guidelines, unless otherwise specified, refer to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines with
1997 Revisions. Id.
3. Id. § 5.1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id
7. Id.
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but instead of focusing on the financial status of the entire
company, the failing division defense only considers the financial
status of the specific division. A division of an otherwise successful
company can qualify for the failing division defense if (1) the
division has negative operating cash flow, (2) the assets of the
division would be sold outside the relevant market absent the
acquisition, and (3) the merging parties were unable to locate a less-
anticompetitive purchaser for the assets.'
The DOJ first indicated that a failing division of an otherwise
successful company could qualify for a failing division defense in the
1982 version of the Merger Guidelines.9 In 1982, commentators
predicted that the failing division defense would become a staple of
antitrust merger enforcement.'0 The enthusiasm with which the
failing division defense was originally received quickly faded.
Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in International
Shoe Co. v. FTC in 1930, courts have widely applied the failing
company defense to mergers involving failing companies, but have
not extended the same protection to mergers involving failing
divisions." Despite the enthusiasm with which the defense was
introduced in the 1982 Merger Guidelines, no court has ever applied
the failing division defense to a merger involving failing divisional
assets.' 2 If the failing company defense is considered a survivor
through seventy years of merger enforcement policy,i" the failing
division defense is analogous to a shipwreck. Instead of applying
the failing division defense, courts have addressed mergers
involving the sale of divisional assets of an otherwise successful
company in the following three ways: (1) considering the merger
under the more widely accepted failing company defense, (2)
8. Id. § 5.2.
9. Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,102 (June 14, 1982) [hereinafter
1982 Merger Guidelines).
10. See Joe Sims & William Blumenthal, New Merger Guidelines Provide No Real
Surprises, LEGAL TIMES, June 21, 1982, at 17 (discussing the Merger Guidelines' treatment
of the failing division defense).
11. 280 U.S. 291, 301-02 (1930); see infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.C.
13. See Richard D. Friedman, Untangling the Failing Company Doctrine, 64 TEX. L. REV.
1375, 1375-76 (1986) (noting how the failing company defense has endured despite being
"often ... ignored or scorned, and rarely invoked with success in litigation" (citations
omitted)).
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applying the weak competitor analysis proposed in United States v.
General Dynamics Corp. ,"4 or (3) in rare cases, mentioning, but not
applying the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. 5 These
three approaches to mergers involving failing divisions harm
competition, decrease certainty in an extremely complex merger
review process, and do not provide the requisite flexibility to
prevent the overriding social harms that may arise from blocking
a merger.
16
Now is the time to reevaluate the failing division defense. In
2001, the District Court for the Northern District of California
noted the existence of the failing division defense and suggested its
willingness to apply the defense in appropriate cases.'7 Although
the court in Sutter Health Systems did not have the opportunity to
apply the failing division defense because the merging party was an
independent legal entity, the court indicated that it would apply the
failing division defense to mergers involving failing divisional assets
in appropriate cases.'" Other courts, particularly the District Court
for the District of Columbia, 9 should follow the Northern District
of California's lead. Merger activity involving failing entities is
skyrocketing in light of the recent wave of bankruptcies.20 The
number of mergers reported to the agencies pursuant to the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) tripled from
1999 to 2000.1 Accordingly, the failing division defense increasingly
is raised before the agencies, providing more opportunities for
judicial review of the failing division defense.22
14. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
18. Id.
19. Substantially all recent federal merger enforcement actions are brought by the
agencies in the District Court for the District of Columbia. See infra note 160 and
accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Gregory Staple & Neil Imus, Telecom for Sale: Worldcom's Market Has
Changed, Merger Rules Should Change Too, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 51 (suggesting
an increase of merger activity involving distressed telecom companies raising "failing"
defenses due to the "current wave of telecom bankruptcies").
21. See Richard G. Parker, Report from the Bureau of Competition (Apr. 7, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/rparkerspringaba0O.htm (last visited July 28, 2003).
22. See Helene D. Jaffe, Developments in Merger Law and Enforcement in 1990-91, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 667, 667 (1991) ("With the downturn in the economy, there has been a
2003]
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This Note considers the approaches of federal antitrust enforce-
ment agencies and courts with respect to the failing division
defense and proposes a two-step Modified Strict Adherence
approach to the review of mergers involving failing divisional
assets. First, in step one, agencies must apply strictly the Merger
Guidelines' three-part failing division defense to the merger.23
In step two, if the FTC or DOJ seek a preliminary injunction
in federal district court blocking a proposed acquisition, after
considering the Merger Guidelines' three-part failing division
defense, the court may weigh the impact of overriding social harms
resulting from blocking the merger against the acquisition's
anticompetitive impact.24 The court may consider various social
harms, including harm to stockholders, employees, and the
surrounding community.
2
Part I of this Note begins with a brief overview of the federal
merger review process and history of the failing division defense in
the Merger Guidelines before considering the two approaches
federal enforcement agencies have taken to address mergers
involving the sale of failing divisional assets. Part II analyzes each
of the three different approaches courts have taken to address
mergers involving the sale of failing divisional assets. After
suggesting reasons for the lack of judicial acceptance of the failing
division defense in Part III, Part IV of this Note proposes and
outlines the two-step Modified Strict Adherence approach to the
failing division defense and explains how this approach better
meets the goals of antitrust enforcement-protecting competition,
increasing certainty, and avoiding inequity by allowing for
flexibility-than the current treatment of the failing division
defense by the agencies and courts.
corresponding upturn in acquisitions involving 'floundering,' 'exiting,' and failing
companies.").
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. See infra Part IV.B.
25. See infra Part IV.B.
432 [Vol. 45:429
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I. THE FORGO2rrEN DEFENSE: THE FAILING DIVISION DEFENSE IN
THE MERGER GUIDELINES
A. The Merger Review Process
The primary authority for federal antitrust enforcement is
Section 7 of the Clayton Act (Section 7), which provides that "[n]o
person ... shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or
more persons [if) ... the effect of such acquisition ... may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.""
The FTC and DOJ are the two principal federal agencies charged
with enforcing Section 7.27 The HSR Act generally requires merging
parties to notify the FTC and DOJ prior to the consummation of all
transactions valued over fifty million dollars.28 Mergers subject to
the HSR Act must submit to a thirty-day waiting period, allowing
one of the agencies to investigate the proposed merger prior to
consummation.29 Although the agencies have overlapping juris-
diction of merger enforcement, under the HSR Act only one agency
may review a proposed merger.3 0 Through a procedure known as
clearance, one agency will authorize or clear the other agency to
26. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000); see THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note
1, at 1.
27. See THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 1, at 6-7. Antitrust law varies by state
and enforcement at that level is by the state attorneys general. Id. at 7. This Note focuses
on the federal antitrust laws and, specifically, merger review by the DOJ and FTC under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 2000. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a (2000).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a). The filing thresholds were recently amended, effective January
17, 2003, increasing the minimum transaction value required for filing under the HSR Act
from fifteen million dollars to fifty million dollars. See 16 C.F.R. § 801.1 (2003).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (2000).
30. See Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative
Analysis of FCC and DOJReview of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29,
31 (2000) (noting that "[dlual review of the same issue by two federal bodies is rare"). For
detailed discussion of the merger review process by the agencies, see THE MERGER REVIEW
PROCESS, supra note 1, ch. 1. Upon receipt of the HSR filing by the merging parties, one
agency must file for and receive clearance from the other agency in order to begin a
preliminary investigation. Id. at 21. If the merger does not pose an anticompetitive threat,
the waiting period will expire or one agency will grant early termination of the waiting
period, allowing the merging parties to proceed. Id. at 8. If serious anticompetitive concerns
arise during the preliminary investigation, the agencies may extend the investigation period
by issuing a "Second Request." Id. at 9-10.
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proceed with an investigation into the potentially anticompetitive
impacts of the proposed acquisition or merger.3 '
The Merger Guidelines represent the agencies' position with
respect to merger enforcement, indicating what factors the agencies
will consider in determining whether a proposed acquisition
violates Section 7.32 The Merger Guidelines define competition in
terms of market power, which is "the ability profitably to maintain
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time."3
Thus, market power is the "ultimate inquiry" for merger enforce-
ment agencies. 4 In the event that a merger is deemed anti-
competitive, the investigating agency may seek to block the merger
by filing for a preliminary injunction in federal district court.35
Accordingly, the HSR Act creates the potential for two stages of
merger review-first by the investigating agency, and second before
the district court.
B. The Failing Division Defense in the Merger Guidelines
The DOJ first alluded to the failing division defense in the 1982
Merger Guidelines by outlining the failing company defense and
then noting that the same defense may apply "when the allegedly
failing firm is an unincorporated part of a larger parent firm."36 The
DOJ revised and reissued the Merger Guidelines in 1984.37 The
31. See THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 1, at 9.
32. Id. at2.
33. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 0.1.
34. See id § 0.2. The courts have taken a similar approach, defining competition in terms
of market share. See United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 547-48 (M.D. Tenn.
1975) (citing United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974)). If the post-
acquisition firm has a combined market share of thirty percent or greater it is presumed
unlawful. I& But cf Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Pursuit of
Economic "Objectivity": Is There Any Role for Social and Political Values in Merger Policy?,
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 279 (1985) (noting that Congress considered political
consequences of economic concentration and national concentrations of wealth in addition
to market share when defining competition).
35. THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 1, at 29-30.
36. 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 9, at V.B.
37. See 1984 Antitrust Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (June 29, 1984)
[hereinafter 1984 Merger Guidelines]. Since the DOJ's first attempt at Merger Guidelines
in 1968, the Merger Guidelines have undergone several revisions. The current joint Merger
Guidelines between the FTC and the DOJ are based on the DOJ's 1982 Merger Guidelines.
See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 9. The 1982 Merger Guidelines were a complete
434 [Vol. 45:429
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1984 Guidelines included the first clear enumeration of a separate
failing division defense.3" In order to qualify for this absolute
defense, the 1984 Merger Guidelines required that the assets of the
division would be "liquidated" if not sold, and that the acquired
company had made "unsuccessful good faith efforts" to locate less
anticompetitive purchasers.3 9
The current version of the failing division defense was
established in section 5.2 of the 1992 Merger Guidelines, which the
DOJ and FTC jointly issued.40 The 1992 Merger Guidelines
established a three-part test for the failing division defense: (1)
"upon applying appropriate cost allocation rules, the division must
have a negative cash flow on an operating basis," (2) "absent the
acquisition, it must be that the assets of the division would exit the
relevant market in the near future if not sold," and (3) the allegedly
failing division must have "made unsuccessful good faith efforts to
elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisition ... that would both
keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and
pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed
merger. "
1
overhaul of the DOJ's prior 1968 Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 1 13,101 (1968). For commentary assessing the probable impact of the 1982
Merger Guidelines, see Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, The 1982 Merger Guidelines
and Preexisting Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 311 (1983); Thomas J. Campbell, The New Merger
Guidelines: A Federal Trade Commission Perspective, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 295 (1982)
[hereinafter Campbell, The New Merger Guidelines]; Thomas E. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines: Of Collusion, Efficiency, and Failure, 71 CAL. L. REV. 497 (1983)
[hereinafter Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. Since 1982, the Merger
Guidelines have been revised and reissued in 1992 and 1997. See 1992/1997 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 2.
38. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, § 5.2.
39. Id. (incorporating the "less anticompetitive purchaser" requirement of the "failing
firm" defense enunciated in § 5.1).
40. Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 5.2 (Sept. 10, 1992) [hereinafter 1992
Merger Guidelines]. This version of the failing division defense survived the 1997 revisions
to the Guidelines, which dealt primarily with changes to the treatment of the efficiencies
defense. See 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, Statement.
41. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5.1, 5.2.
20031 435
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C. Agency Application of the Merger Guidelines' Failing Division
Defense
Although merging companies raise the failing division defense
with increased frequency before the agencies, limited information
exists on the agencies' treatment of the defense due to the
confidential nature of HSR Act filings and investigations. 2 The few
cases raising the defense brought before the courts, agency press
releases, and commentary on agency action in legal publications,
however, provide insight into how agencies review mergers in
which parties raise the failing division defense. When merging
parties raise a failing division defense, the agencies take one of two
opposite approaches: either strictly applying the requirements
of the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense or exercising
prosecutorial discretion and not challenging the proposed merger.
1. Strict Application of the Merger Guidelines' Failing Division
Defense
Documentation from two investigations indicates that when the
agencies consider the failing division defense they will construe
strictly the Merger Guidelines' three-part analysis. First, in 1990,
the FTC investigated a joint venture between two telescope sub-
sidiaries.'3 Meade and Celestron were the two dominant players in
the United States market for Schmidt-Cassegrain telescopes,
primarily used for hobby viewing by amateur astronomers." The
FTC found thejoint venture prima facie anticompetitive and sought
a preliminary injunction blocking the merger in the District Court
for the District of Columbia.' The district court's discussion of the
FTC's findings regarding the "only available purchaser" prong
reflects the FTC's narrow treatment of the failing division defense.'
42. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § ISa (2000); THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS,
supra note 1, ch. 1, § C.
43. See FTC v. Harbour Group Invs., L.P., No. CIV.A.90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at *1
(D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1990).
44. Id.
45. Id. at *3.
46. The merging parties actually raised the failing company defense, not the failing
division defense, before the district court because the District Court for the District of
436 [Vol. 45:429
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Although the parties conducted a search for alternative purchasers,
the FTC found the search was inadequate, noting that the parties
searched for alternative purchasers only after agreeing to the terms
of the joint venture. 7 In upholding the findings of the FTC and
granting the agency's request for a preliminary injunction blocking
the merger,'8 the district court found that "[the parties'] search for
an alternative [purchaser] ... was characterized by a minimal effort
and designed primarily to be perfunctory." 9 The FTC went one step
beyond requiring the parties to make "unsuccessful good faith
efforts" to locate less-anticompetitive alternative purchasers as the
Merger Guidelines require, and conducted its own search for
possible purchasers and alternatives to the joint venture.50 Under
the FTC's narrow construction of the only available purchaser
prong of the failing division defense, "unsuccessful good faith
efforts" by merging parties may not be enough to meet the stringent
requirements of section 5.2.
Also in 1990, the FTC authorized Commission staff to seek a
preliminary injunction to block FlightSafety International's acqui-
sition of the flight simulator assets of its competitor, Bicoastal.5'
FTC staff attorneys found that even if Bicoastal's SimuFlite
division had negative operating cash flow, the merging parties
failed to prove both that the assets of the division would exit the
market absent the acquisition and that the parties had made
"unsuccessful good faith efforts" to locate alternative purchasers.52
Narrowly construing the Merger Guidelines' failing division
defense, the FTC "insisted on proof not only that SimuFlite would
be liquidated, but that its assets would exit the market in a
Columbia has not yet accepted the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. Id. at *2. At
this point in the discussion, distinguishing between the two defenses is irrelevant because
the only available purchaser requirement is identical for both the failing company and failing
division defenses.
47. Id.
48. The district court's treatment of the Meade/Celestron joint venture is discussed in
greater detail in Part II, infra.
49. Harbour Group, 1990 WL 198819, at *4.
50. Id. at *5.
51. See Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission Will Seek to Halt FlightSafety
International's Acquisition of Bicoastal Corp.'s SimuFlite Assets (June 26, 1990), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/flightaft7.txt (last visited July 28, 2003).
52. See Jaffe, supra note 22, at 670 n.23.
20031 437
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
liquidation, rather than be acquired by less-anticompetitive
[acquirers] ."
2. Prosecutorial Discretion
In addition to narrowly applying the Merger Guidelines' failing
division defense, the agencies also choose not to challenge many
mergers in which the merging parties raise the failing division
defense.5' Due to the confidential nature of the HSR filings, it is
impossible to know exactly how many mergers in which parties
raise the failing division defense are allowed to proceed under the
exercise of the agencies' prosecutorial discretion.55 The agencies'
authority to enforce Section 7 is discretionary, not mandatory.5 The
use of prosecutorial discretion, however, has led to criticism of the
disparity between the agencies' written policy on merger review in
the Merger Guidelines and their actual practice. "Whatever the
Department [of Justice] publicly says, it has long considered
division failure on an ad hoc, unsystematic basis."5 7
II. AN "UNSETTLED AREA OF LAW": THE FAILING DIVISION
DEFENSE IN THE COURTS
The failing division defense currently does not exist outside the
context of the Merger Guidelines. Although the agencies have
applied the failing division defense to mergers involving the sale of
failing divisional assets,"M courts have not done so. Instead, courts
have approached antitrust challenges to the sale of divisional assets
in three ways. First, some courts have considered the sale of failing
divisional assets under the similar failing company defense. 9
53. Id.
54. See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers
and Antitrust Law, 23 Am. J.L. & MED. 191, 198 (1997) (noting that "the agencies routinely
exercise their prosecutorial discretion not to challenge many acquisitions that appear to
violate the Merger Guidelines').
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
57. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, at 529.
58. See supra Part I.
59. See infra Part II.A.
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Second, because the failing division defense is only applied after a
prima facie showing that the merger is anticompetitive, many
courts have avoided construing the failing division defense by
applying the analysis in United States v. General Dynamics Corp.'
to find that the merger is not anticompetitive in the first place.6
Finally, some courts have noted the existence of a failing division
defense, but declined to decide the case on the merits of such a
defense.62 Discussion of these three approaches will show the courts'
overall treatment of the failing division defense as an "unsettled
area of law""' despite its clear enumeration in the Merger
Guidelines.
A. The Survivor: The Failing Company Defense
The failing company defense "allows a competitor to acquire a
firm that is facing grave financial difficulties even if the acquisition
will reduce competition."' To qualify for the failing company de-
fense, courts have traditionally looked to whether a company will
file for bankruptcy to determine if the company faces "the grave
probability of business failure."' Despite the impossibility of a
division filing for bankruptcy, the courts have applied the failing
company defense to mergers involving failing divisional assets. A
brief survey of the history of the failing company defense provides
the background necessary for understanding the application of the
failing company defense to failing divisions.
1. A Brief History of the Failing Company Defense
The Supreme Court first recognized that a company's failing
status could be an absolute defense to a Section 7 enforcement
60. 415 U.S. 486, 506 (1974).
61. See infra Part 1I.B.
62. See infra Part II.C.
63. FTC v. Harbour Group Invs., L.P., No. CIV.A.90-2525,1990 WL 198819, at *5 (D.D.C.
Nov. 19, 1990).
64. Thomas J. Campbell, The Efficiency of the Failing Company Defense, 63 TEX. L. REv.
251, 251 (1984) [hereinafter Campbell, Efficiency].
65. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969) (quoting Intl Shoe Co.
v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930)).
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action in International Shoe Co. v. FTC.66 The International Shoe
Company merged with its competitor, the financially defunct W.H.
McElwain Company." In recognizing what is now referred to as the
failing company defense, the Supreme Court held that acquisitions
involving failing companies, although anticompetitive by definition,
do not always violate Section 76 The Court held that a merger
of a corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect of
rehabilitation so remote that it faced the grave probability of a
business failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury
to the communities where its plants were operated ... is not in
contemplation of law prejudicial to the public and does not
substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce within
the intent of the Clayton Act. 9
The passage of the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act, which amended
sections 7 and 10 of the Clayton Act, further validated the failing
company defense.70 Citing the above language of International Shoe
with approval, Congress recognized that Section 7 should not apply
to mergers involving failing entities and "unequivocally endorsed
the defense."71
In 1969, almost forty years after the landmark International
Shoe decision, the Supreme Court in Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States provided the modern framework for the failing
company defense.72 Citizen Publishing involved a joint operating
agreement between the only two daily newspapers of general
circulation in Tucson, Arizona.73 The newspapers argued that the
joint operating agreement did not violate Section 7 because Citizen
Publishing, one of the newspaper publishers, qualified for the
failing company defense.7 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas
set forth a three-part analysis for the failing company defense: (1)
66. 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
67. Id. at 293-94.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 302-03.
70. See S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 7 (1950); Campbell, Efficiency, supra note 64, at 254.
71. Campbell, Efficiency, supra note 64, at 254 (citing S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 7).
72. 394 U.S. 131, 136-39 (1969).
73. Id. at 133.
74. Id. at 136.
440 [Vol. 45:429
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the acquired company must be in imminent danger of failure; (2)
prospects of reorganization must be dim or non-existent; and (3) the
parties must make a good faith effort to determine that there are no
alternative purchasers.75 Applying the findings of the lower court to
this framework, the Court determined that Citizen Publishing did
not qualify for the failing company defense because there was no
evidence that (1) the owners tried to locate a less-anticompetitive
purchaser or (2) the company would have shut down but for the
joint operating agreement between the two publishers.76 With little
variation, the Citizen Publishing three-part test is still used widely
by many jurisdictions to make failing company determinations and
it served as the basis for the failing company defense enumerated
in the Merger Guidelines."
2. Application of the Failing Company Defense to the Sale of
Divisional Assets
Instead of developing a separate failing division defense, some
courts have applied the Citizen Publishing three-part failing com-
pany defense to the sale of failing divisional assets. In 1972, the
District Court for the Central District of California applied the
failing company defense to a wholly owned subsidiary in Calnetics
Corp. v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc . 7 The defense was not success-
ful because the company failed to demonstrate adequately its failing
status and the unavailability of alternative purchasers under the
Citizen Publishing three-part test.79 Even though the acquired
company's financial statements indicated a net loss immediately
prior to the acquisition, the court considered the company's retained
75. Id. at 136-38. These requirements vary slightly from the current test for failing
company defense as set forth in § 5.1 of the Merger Guidelines. See 1992/1997 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.1. The Merger Guidelines' test additionally requires that the
firm is unable to meet its financial obligations as they come due and that the failing company
is unable to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id.
76. Citizen Publ'g Co., 394 U.S. at 137-39.
77. See, e.g., California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
2001); Reilly v. Hearst Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1196 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Dr Pepper/Seven-
Up Cos. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762, 778 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd in part, 991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir.
1993); FTC v. Harbour Group Invs., L.P., No. CIV.A.90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at *2 (D.D.C.
Nov. 19, 1990); cf 19921997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.1.
78. 348 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
79. Id. at 622.
20031 441
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earnings surplus and found that the company was not facing a
"grave probability of business failure."s° The court also found that
the parties had not made sufficient efforts to locate alternative
purchasers, noting that the company did not hire a broker to
manage the sale and that the company ignored possible sales
leads.8
In addition to wholly owned subsidiaries, courts have also applied
the failing company defense to mergers involving divisions of larger
companies. In 1984, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio considered Bass Brothers' purchase of the carbon black assets
of the Ashland Oil Company.8 2 Although citing Citizen Publishing,
the court seemingly applied a different analysis.' Instead of con-
sidering whether the parent company met the requirements of the
Citizen Publishing test, the court looked at the profitability of the
division and whether the assets of the division in question would
exit the relevant market absent the acquisition.8" Enjoining the
merger by granting the FTC's motion for summary judgment, the
court found the carbon black division was profitable immediately
prior to the proposed acquisition and that Ashland's "'contingency
plan' [was] to try to find another buyer" not to sell the carbon black
assets outside the relevant market.'
In 1992, the District Court for the District of Columbia
considered the application of the Citizen Publishing failing company
defense to the acquisition of the Brooklyn Bottling assets of the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. FTC v. Bass Bros. Enters., Nos. C84-1304, C84-1311, 1984 WL 355, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
June 6, 1984).
83. Id. at *26.
84. Id. at *18. The court also addressed the second Merger Guidelines requirement-that
no alternative purchaser exists. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, § 5.2. The
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, like the court in Calnetics, found that
Ashland's efforts were insufficient to sustain the failing company defense because it 'made
no formal effort to find any buyer.... It never retained an investment banker to find a buyer.'
Bass Bros. Enters., 1984 WL 355, at *18.
85. Bass Bros. Enters., 1984 WL 355, at *18 (finding not only that the carbon black
division was profitable at the time of the acquisition, but also that the division was likely to
remain profitable for at least another year). The analysis the Bass Bros. court used is
strikingly similar to the modern Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. See 1992/1997
Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2.
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Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Companies.8" Although the purchaser,
Honickman, only acquired certain assets (which could have
constituted a division) of the Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Companies, the
court cited the language in Citizen Publishing requiring "dim or
nonexistent" prospects of reorganization under the bankruptcy
laws.87 The district court found that the merging parties did not
qualify for the failing company defense because "[the purchaser]
had failed to establish that he was the sole plausible acquirer of
Seven-Up Brooklyn."8 On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
remanded the case to the district court after finding that the dis-
trict court's granting of summary judgment blocking the merger
was arbitrary and capricious.89 The District of Columbia Circuit,
however, did not question the district court's use of the Citizen
Publishing failing company defense instead of applying the failing
division defense. 90
B. The Alternative: General Dynamics
In addition to applying the failing company defense to mergers
involving failing divisional assets, courts have taken a second
approach-applying the analysis in United States v. General
Dynamics Corp. to find that the proposed merger is not prima facie
anticompetitive.91 By finding the merger does not threaten market
competition, the courts do not have to reach the issue of a failing
division defense.
1. General Dynamics Generally
Recognizing that external market factors may impact a currently
viable firm's future ability to compete successfully in the relevant
86. Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 798 F. Supp. 762,764 (D.D.C. 1992), rev'd in part,
991 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Also in 1992, the agencies issued their first joint Merger
Guidelines, outlining the current failing division defense. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 40, § 5.2.
87. Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos., 798 F. Supp. at 778 (citing Citizen Pubrg Co. v. United
States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969)).
88. Id. at 778.
89. Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 864-66 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
90. See id.
91. 415 U.S. 486, 508 (1974).
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market, the Supreme Court in General Dynamics established the
"weak competitor" analysis to rebut the agency's prima facie case
that a merger was anticompetitive.92 The General Dynamics Court
permitted the merger of two competitive coal companies after
considering recent changes in the coal market.9" Although United
Coal was successful at the time of its acquisition by General
Dynamics, the Court concluded that evidence of the company's past
performance did not accurately reflect its future ability to
compete.94 United Coal lacked the coal reserves necessary to secure
future contracts.95 The Court held that the acquisition did not vio-
late Section 7, because the company was unlikely to be a significant
competitor in the coal industry absent the acquisition.6
General Dynamics represented a significant shift in the Court's
view of which mergers violated Section 7.97 Today, the General
Dynamics analysis stands for the proposition that "forward-looking
analysis of market conditions" can rebut an agency's prima facie
case that a proposed merger is anticompetitive.98 Inaccurate future
market share statistics do not establish an absolute defense, but
92. See id. For a review of the Court's decision in General Dynamics, see Jeff King, Note,
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Revisited: Recommendations for a Unitary Merger Defense, 11
KAN. J.L. & PuB. PoLY 363 (2001), and Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 92 HARV. L. REV. 491 (1978).
93. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 506.
94. Id. at 502.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 510-11.
97. See Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLuM. L. REV.
243, 244 (commenting that Justice Stewart's opinion in General Dynamics might have
represented the "dawning of a new day" in antitrust enforcement); see also Note, Horizontal
Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics Corp., supra note 92, at 499 (noting that
this decision signaled a new approach). The decision was the first time the Supreme Court
decided a merger case against the government. See id. at 492 (noting that prior to General
Dynamics, 'the Government won every horizontal merger case decided by written opinion
in the Supreme Court"). Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court in General Dynamics
only eight years after his famous dissent in Von's Grocery, where he declared: "The sole
consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the Government always
wins." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966). The General Dynamics
decision later impacted the 1982 Merger Guidelines, which indicated that market data may
not always accurately reflect future ability to compete. See 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra
note 9, Part III.C. The current Merger Guidelines indicate that "in some situations, market
share and market concentration data may either understate or overstate the likely future
competitive significance of a firm or firms in the market or the impact of a merger."
1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.52.
98. Greaney, supra note 54, at 216.
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rather provide a means of demonstrating that the acquisition
does not violate Section 7 in the first place. Although the General
Dynamics approach has been described as a "cousin to the failing
company defense,"99 unlike the failing division defense, which con-
siders internal factors, such as management decisions to liquidate
failing assets, the General Dynamics analysis only considers the
impact of external market factors on post-acquisition market
shares.
2. General Dynamics Applied to Failing Divisions
In addition to applying the Citizen Publishing failing company
defense to enforcement actions involving failing divisions, courts
also have applied the General Dynamics analysis. In FTC v. Great
Lakes Chemical Corp., the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois denied the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction
despite the FTC's finding that Great Lakes' acquisition of Velsicol's
bromine division violated Section 7. "° Under the General Dynamics
analysis, the court considered the impact of a "constantly evolving
market" on the accuracy of market share data.1 After noting that
in the bromine market "a company's future ability to compete is
reflected less in past production statistics than in the vigor of its
current research and development efforts," the court held that
Great Lakes had sufficiently rebutted the FTC's prima facie case.lO2
The District Court for the Northern District of Ohio also applied
the General Dynamics analysis to the sale of failing divisional
assets.03 In FTC v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, which involved
the sale of Ashland Oil's carbon black division, the merging parties
argued that the acquisition was not anticompetitive under the
General Dynamics analysis and, alternatively, that they were en-
titled to merge under the failing company defense.'0 4 After finding
99. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1979).
100. 528 F. Supp. 84, 99 (N.D. Il1. 1981).
101. Id. at 91.
102. Id.
103. FTC v. Bass Bros. Enters., Nos. C84-1304, C84-1311, 1984 WL 355 (N.D. Ohio June
6, 1984).
104. See id. at *26 (outlining the court's Conclusions of Law). For consideration of the
court's decision regarding the failing company defense, see supra notes 82-85 and
accompanying text.
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the acquisition prima facie anticompetitive, the court considered the
"structure, history, and probable future" of the carbon black market
under the General Dynamics analysis." 5 The court granted the
FTC's request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the
FTC's statistics "accurately depict [Bass Brothers' and Ashland's]
likely future competitive potential."0 6
In 1990, the District of Columbia Circuit applied the General
Dynamics analysis to a merger involving two subsidiary corpo-
rations in United States v. Baker Hughes.'°7 Upholding the lower
court's denial of a preliminary injunction, the court allowed a
company's acquisition of its competitor's hardrock hydraulic under-
ground drilling rigs (HHUDRs) division. °s The DOJ "present[ed]
statistics showing that combining the market shares of [the two
producers] would significantly increase concentration in the already
highly concentrated United States HHUDR market.""0 9 The court
found that "the government's statistics were misleading," because
the HHUDR market was historically characterized by few players
and the parties pointed out that in a given year only twenty-two
rigs were sold in the relevant market."0 Considering these external
market factors under the General Dynamics analysis, the court
denied the DOJ's request for a preliminary injunction and allowed
the merger."
C. The Shipwreck: The Failing Division Defense
In addition to applying the failing company defense or the
General Dynamics analysis to merger enforcement actions brought
under Section 7 involving the sale of failing divisional assets, three
cases-all in federal district courts-have considered applying a
failing division defense. No court, however, has decided a merger
case on the merits of such a defense. 1 2
105. Bass Bros. Enters., 1984 WL 355, at **25-26.
106. Id. at *26.
107. 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 983.
110. Id. at 986.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1133-34 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that there is a failing division defense, but that it was unnecessary to apply
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In 1967, the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
considered the possibility of a failing division defense in United
States v. Reed Roller Bit Co."' Dissatisfied with its wholly owned
subsidiary, American Iron, AMF hired a broker who arranged for
the subsidiary's sale to Reed Roller. 114 American Iron and Reed
Roller were the second and third largest producers of tool joints in
the relevant market."' After finding the merger prima facie
unlawful under Section 7, the court considered AMF's argument
that the failing company defense should apply to failing sub-
sidiaries."6 The court found that, although "American Iron's poor
performance made it a most unattractive subsidiary, it was not
near bankruptcy.... "" The existence of a failing division defense
was a novel issue before this court, but the court only addressed the
failing division defense in a footnote." 8 Because the subsidiary was
not failing, it would not have qualified for the failing division
defense. The court, therefore, did not need to reach the issue of
whether it would recognize a failing division defense." 9
Reed Roller set the stage for courts to forestall application of the
failing division defense. 20 More recently, the District Court for the
District of Columbia also refused to consider whether a failing
division defense existed.'2 ' In Harbour Group, the merging parties,
two telescope manufacturers, were unable "to demonstrate that the
it in a case where the merging parties successfully proved the failing company defense).
113. 274 F. Supp. 573, 584 n.1 (W.D. Okla. 1967).
114. Id. at 576.
115. Id. at 579.
116. Id. at 583.
117. Id. at 584.
118. Id. at 584 n.1.
119. Id. at 584 n.1 ("Thus, it is unnecessary to decide whether the failing company
doctrine extends to the sale of an unprofitable subsidiary of a prosperous parent company.").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Blue Bell, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 538, 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
In Blue Bell, the parties argued that the acquisition of an industrial laundry division by a
competitor did not violate Section 7, claiming protection of the failing division defense. Id.
Although the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee did not decide whether a
failing division defense existed, it did note, however, that even if one did exist, unsatisfactory
performance would not "put [a division] within the definition of a 'failing company' defense."
Id.
121. See FTC v. Harbour Group Invs., L.P., No. CIV.A.90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at *2
(D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1990). This case was decided the same year that the D.C. Circuit applied the
General Dynamics analysis to a merger involving a failing division in Baker Hughes. See
supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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merger [was] the 'only available' alternative."'22 The court found it
unnecessary to decide on the failing division defense and "construe
this unsettled area of law,' 12 because even if the court recognized
the failing division defense it would not have applied to the facts of
this case.
The only case to acknowledge a separate failing division defense
was California v. Sutter Health Systems. 124 In 2001, the District
Court for the Northern District of California accepted the failing
division defense in dicta."2 Although this court recognized the
failing division defense, it did not have the opportunity to apply it
because, as a wholly owned subsidiary, the failing entity in question
was an independent legal entity-not a division. 12 Accordingly, the
court applied the failing company defense, not the failing division
defense. 127
III. WHY HAVE THE COURTS FAILED TO ACCEPT THE FAILING
DIVISION DEFENSE?
After the adoption of the 1982 Merger Guidelines, commentators
predicted that the issue of the failing division defense would "be
back again and again in the near future.""2 So why have the courts
ignored and avoided applying the failing division defense? First,
courts may not have had adequate opportunity to consider the
failing division defense. 129 Second, courts may fear that increased
application of the defense will create incentives to manipulate
company data to meet the defense's strict evidentiary require-
ments.130 Finally, some courts may perceive that the failing division
defense is unnecessary in light of the increased application of the
General Dynamics analysis.' 3 ' The Modified Strict Adherence
122. Harbour Group Invs., 1990 WL 198819, at *2.
123. Id. at *2 n.7.
124. 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
125. Id. at 1134.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Sims & Blumenthal, supra note 10, at 17 (discussing the Merger Guidelines'
treatment of the failing division defense).
129. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
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approach proposed in Part IV of this Note addresses each of these
reasons for the non-acceptance of the failing division defense.
A. Lack of Opportunity
The District Court for the District of Columbia in FTC v. Harbour
Group Investments'32 noted that it would not consider the appli-
cation of the failing division defense because it did not wish "to
construe this unsettled area of law."13 The unwillingness of courts
to consider the failing division defense may have had a circular
effect: that of discouraging merging parties from raising the defense
before the courts, and, because merging parties rarely raise the
failing division defense, it remains "an unsettled area of law"
further discouraging parties from raising the defense. 134
Although merging parties frequently raise the failing division
defense in investigations before the agencies, 13 5 it is rare for
mergers involving the failing division defense to actually make it to
court. 3 ' If an agency seeks a preliminary injunction after inves-
tigating a merger, the merging parties have significant incentives
to negotiate a settlement with the investigating agency if the failing
division defense is the foundation of their legal case.137 As "[tihe
most important factor is usually counsel's assessment of how the
client would fare in court,"13s courts' non-acceptance of the failing
division defense discourages counsel from pursuing judicial review
of challenged mergers to which the defense might apply.'39
132. FTC v. Harbour Group Invs., L.P., No. CIV.A.90-2525, 1990 WL 198819 (D.D.C. Nov.
19, 1990).
133. Id. at *2 n.7.
134. Id.
135. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
136. Cf Troy Paredes, Note, Turning the Failing Firm Defense Into a Success: A Proposal
to Revise the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 347, 354 n.21 (1996).
Discussing mergers generally, Mr. Paredes noted that "[miost mergers that the Agencies
investigate never go to trial but are resolved at the preliminary injunction stage or in the
offices of the Agencies when the combining parties make their case to them." Id.
137. See THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS, supra note 1, at 248-49 (suggesting that when
debating whether to enter into negotiations for a consent agreement, merger counsel should
consider their client's likelihood of success in court, "monetary and nonmonetary costs of
litigation," and the "likely terms of the consent order").
138. Id.
139. Merging parties relying solely on a failing division defense have no hope of success
in most jurisdictions. See supra Part II. The exceptions to this general trend of non-
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The number of cases before courts raising the failing division
defense would likely increase if counsel were assured that the
defense would bejudicially considered and ultimately accepted. The
Modified Strict Adherence approach proposed by this Note secures
acceptance of the failing division defense by requiring courts to
consider the Merger Guidelines' three-prong failing division defense
in step two.
B. Manipulability of "Failing" Status
Another reason courts may be reluctant to accept the failing
division defense is that increased application of the defense may
tempt companies to allocate costs among divisions or to "manipulate
the capital structure of a wholly owned subsidiary" in order to
create a "failing division."14 ° In order to qualify as "failing" under
the Merger Guidelines, a division "must have negative cash flow on
an operating basis. "141 Courts may fear that application of the
failing division defense would allow mergers that would otherwise
not be permitted under the Merger Guidelines and Section 7, "but
for the parties' success at manipulating their facts to fit the
defense."142
Unjustifiable fear of manipulation should not preclude the
application of a defense that is otherwise beneficial.'43 Strict
acceptance are the cases brought in the District Courts for the Northern District of California
and the Northern District of Illinois. See California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d
1109, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2001); FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84, 96 (N.D. Ill.
1981). One case in each of the above jurisdictions, however, is unlikely to create a large
enough incentive for merger counsel to risk inapplicability of the defense in light of the
expense of complex antitrust litigation.
140. AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, 4 ANTITRUST LAW I 953e (1998); see Kauper, The
1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, at 528-29 (discussing the difficulties of
assessing the failure of a division and how "the larger entity can manipulate data and
arbitrarily allocate costs'); Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., supra note 92, at 377 ("With the complex nature of modem industries, a
relaxed failing firm standard would create conditions ripe for managerial manipulation of
financials to produce a mirage of compliance.").
141. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2.
142. Paredes, supra note 136, at 374.
143. Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, at 528-29 (arguing
that fear of manipulation is not sufficient to completely preclude use of the failing division
defense); see also AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 140, 953e (arguing that "the
parent should be permitted to make a showing that would establish a Tailing division'). For
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adherence to the Merger Guidelines' three-prong failing division
defense, as proposed in step one of the Modified Strict Adherence
approach, can curb these fears through the implementation of
safeguards against data manipulation. First, as an evidentiary
safeguard, the Merger Guidelines require evidence of the division's
failure that was produced prior to the merger negotiations. "
Second, the merging parties bear the burden of proving all three
prongs of the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense.
145
Accordingly, fact-finders can consider the reliability of the parties'
financial evidence when deciding whether the division is actually
failing, which reduces incentives for companies to manipulate
financial data.
C. Is the Failing Division Defense Necessary in Light of General
Dynamics?
A third reason courts have not accepted the failing division
defense may be the application of the General Dynamics146 analysis
in cases involving failing divisional assets. Courts recently have
applied the General Dynamics analysis to mergers which may
have otherwise qualified for the failing division defense. 147 Merging
parties that could potentially successfully defend against a
Section 7 enforcement action by raising the failing division defense
also argue that the merger is not prima facie anticompetitive under
additional discussion of the benefits of the failing division defense, see infra Part IV.
144. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2. The guidelines state:
Due to the ability of the parent firm to allocate costs, revenues, and
intracompany transactions among itself and its subsidiaries and divisions, the
Agency will require evidence, not based solely on management plans that could
be prepared solely for the purpose of demonstrating negative cash flow or the
prospect of exit from the relevant market.
Id.
145. Although the Merger Guidelines do not assign burdens, the agencies defer to the
judicially assigned burdens with respect to the failing defenses. 19921997 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 2, at Statement ("The language, therefore, is intended to be burden.
neutral, without altering the burdens of proof or burdens of coming forward as those
standards have been established by the courts."). The burden of proof historically rests with
the party asserting the failing defense. See, e.g., Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S.
131, 138-39 (1969) ("The burden of proving that the conditions of the failing company
doctrine have been satisfied is on those who seek refuge under it." (citations omitted)).
146. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
147. See supra Part II.B.
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the General Dynamics analysis, 148 which may cause courts to
consider the failing division defense unnecessary if the case can be
decided under the General Dynamics analysis alone.
In many cases, a firm that might consider arguing a failing
division defense to a merger enforcement action may also qualify to
argue that the acquired firm is not a strong competitor in the
relevant market under General Dynamics. This overlap has
somewhat blurred the evidentiary distinction between the General
Dynamics analysis and the failing division defense. 149 The Court
in General Dynamics focused on external market factors to
determine whether current market shares of the merging firms
accurately reflected the competitive impact of the proposed merger.
Distinguishing this analysis from the failing company defense, the
Court explained that consideration of market realities was
inapposite to a finding that the merging company was failing. 5 '
Although the General Dynamics analysis and the failing division
defense may apply in many of the same cases, they are sufficiently
different to warrant the acceptance and use of both approaches to
merger review. 151 The fundamental difference between the analysis
in General Dynamics and the failing division defense is one of form:
the analysis in General Dynamics is used to refute the agency's
prima facie finding that a merger is anticompetitive; conversely, the
failing division defense is, as it is aptly called, an absolute defense
applied after a finding that a merger is anticompetitive. 5 2 The
148. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324, 1338 (7th Cir.
1981). Although the Seventh Circuit decided Kaiser under the General'Dynamics analysis,
the merging parties could have raised the failing division defense. The assets in question
constituted a division of a larger company. Id. at 1329. In addition, the parties argued that
the reason the proposed merger would not substantially lessen competition under the
General Dynamics analysis was because "lack of financial resources adversely affected
Lavino's ability to compete." Id. at 1338. This argument sounds more like a failing division
defense argument than a General Dynamics one.
149. See, e.g., id. at 1341 (explaining that "while it may be a relevant factor in some cases,
[financial weakness] certainly cannot be the primary justification of a merger in resistance
to a [Section] 7 proceeding); see also United States v. Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1428-29
(W.D. Mich. 1989).
150. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 498-99.
151. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
152. See Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 507-08 (explaining the difference between its
analysis and the failing company defense); see also Kaiser Aluminum, 652 F.2d at 1340
("Characterization of the defense in General Dynamics as an 'affirmative defense' is wrong.");
Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics Corp., supra note 92, at
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Court in General Dynamics clarified that its analysis proved "an
entirely different point" than the analysis under a failing defense."S
"Rather than showing that United would have gone out of business
but for the merger with Material Service, the finding of inadequate
reserves went to the heart of the Government's statistical prima
facie case ... 154
The General Dynamics analysis is inadequate to address some
mergers that would otherwise be approved under the failing
division defense. Consider a merger of a division which otherwise
meets the qualifications of the Merger Guidelines' failing division
defense 5 but has a large market share. Assume that this hypo-
thetical failing division is in a market such that operating at
current levels, the failing division could maintain or even increase
its competitive position in the market if the parent company
continued to sink money from more profitable areas of the business
into this "money trap." Under the General Dynamics analysis, this
merger would fail because the failing division would remain a viable
competitor in the relevant market. Application of the failing
division defense in this situation would allow the company to sell
off this division as a discrete operating unit without the harm-
financial, competitive and otherwise-of a piecemeal sale.ls
Accordingly, because the General Dynamics analysis and the failing
division defense address fundamentally different considerations
and do not necessarily always overlap, the acceptance and use of
both analyses to sales involving failing divisional assets are
required.
378-79. The argument that the failing division defense and the General Dynamics analysis
lead to the same outcome and, therefore, it does not matter which analysis is applied is
beyond the scope of this Note. For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to note that
the General Dynamics approach and failing division defense are fundamentally, if not
practically, different.
153. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 508.
154. Id.
155. For instance, if the division has negative operating cash flow, the assets would
otherwise exit the relevant market absent the acquisition, and the parties made unsuccessful
good faith efforts to locate less anticompetitive alternative purchasers. See 1992/1997 Merger
Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2.
156. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE MODIFIED STRICT ADHERENCE APPROACH TO THE FAILING
DIVISION DEFENSE
Any proposal to modify the approach taken by the agencies and
courts with respect to the failing division defense should protect
competition, increase certainty, and provide a guarded level of
flexibility in the merger review process.1,5 7 Current treatment both
within the agencies and courts of mergers involving failing divi-
sional assets fails to meet these three goals. l"'
This Note proposes that the agencies adopt a two-step Modified
Strict Adherence approach to the failing division defense. In step
one, an agency investigating a merger in which the parties raise the
failing division defense must evaluate the defense under the strict
Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. Step two applies when
a merger is challenged in court. In step two, the court must first
apply the strict Merger Guidelines' test required in step one. If,
however, overriding social harm to stockholders, employees,
creditors, or the surrounding community may result if the merger
is blocked, the court may weigh these harms against the anti-
competitive impact of the acquisition to determine if equity
warrants allowing the merger in violation of Section 7.
Before considering how the Modified Strict Adherence approach
achieves the above three goals-protecting competition, certainty,
and flexibility-a discussion of how the courts will apply this
approach, in light of their past application of the failing company
defense, is useful.
A. The Merger Guidelines' Test
The Merger Guidelines outline a three-part test to determine
whether a failing division qualifies for protection against Section 7
enforcement actions: (1) "the division must have a negative cash
157. See Am. BAR ASS'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH 12: HORIZONTAL
MERGERS: LAWAND POLICY 5-9 an. 23-33. Other proposed goals of antitrust policy include the
favorable political impact of mergers and the prevention of exploitation of minorities and the
disadvantaged. See Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051, 1066 (1979); Remarks of Michael Pertschuk before the National Press Club 12 (Sept.
25, 1984).
158. See infra Part IV.B.
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flow on an operating basis," (2) "absent the acquisition, it must be
that the assets of the division would exit the relevant market in
the near future," and (3) the owner must make "unsuccessful good
faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers of acquisition of
the assets of the failing firm that would both keep its tangible
and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less
severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger."'59
Consideration of how courts have applied the similar failing
company defense requirements illustrates how courts may consider
the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. This Note's analysis
focuses on the District of Columbia Circuit, where the agencies
bring a substantial majority of their enforcement actions.1 e
1. Negative Cash Flow on an Operating Basis
First, a successful application of the failing division defense
requires that "the division must have a negative cash flow on an
operating basis. " 16' The agencies have defined negative cash flow
in terms of generally accepted accounting principles and have
carefully scrutinized the merging parties' financial statements to
determine whether this prong has been met.1 2 The District of
159. 199211997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5.1, 5.2 (footnote omitted).
160. In Fiscal Year 2001, the agencies challenged nine mergers in federal district
court-eight by the DOJ and one by the FTC-all of which were filed in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FTC HSR ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001 14-20, available at http'//www.ftc.gov (last updated Mar.
7, 2003). This report includes statistics from October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001. Id. at
3.
161. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2. Both the courts and agencies agree
that the relevant time period for assessing the fim's condition is at the time of the proposed
acquisition. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1261 (C.D. Cal.
1973) ("[T]he legality of an acquisition under [Sectionl 7 must be determined on the basis of
objective evidence of conditions as they existed at the time ofsuit."); In re United States Steel
Corp., 74 F.T.C. 1270, 1279-80 (1968), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States Steel
Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that failing status depends on the
financial status of the company at the time of the acquisition); LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM,
INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 176 (3d ed. 2002). But cf CHARLES
R. WRIGHT, UNDERSTANDING AND USING FINANCIAL DATA: AN ERNST & YOUNG GUIDE FOR
ATTORNEYS 133-34 (2d ed. 1996) ([Clash flows can increase while the company is operating
at a loss .... Do not be fooled by looking at only one part of the picture.").
162. Operating cash flow is generally reported on a company's Statement of Cash Flows
as one of three cash flow considerations: Operating, Investing, and Financial activities.
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 161, at 177-78; WRIGHT, supra note 161, at 130.
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Columbia Circuit is likely to consider a company's financial
statements to determine whether its division is failing, because the
court already considers financial statements to determine whether
the company "face[s] the grave probability of business failure" as
required by the Citizen Publishing failing company defense. 163 In
Michigan Citizens, the District of Columbia Circuit held that a
firm faces the grave probability of business failure only when "the
owners of the 'failing' company are contemplating liquidation;
indeed, the [merger] must be the 'last straw' at which the company
can grasp."
16 4
2. Assets Would Otherwise Exit
The second requirement of the Merger Guidelines' failing division
defense is that, "absent the acquisition, it must be that the assets
of the division would exit the relevant market in the near future
if not sold."' 65 Although the District of Columbia Circuit has not
addressed this prong with respect to the failing company defense,
the Second Circuit has found that the assets of the failing division
would otherwise "exit the relevant market"166 if the company
intended to shut down the division and liquidate its assets absent
the acquisition and if the company is not undertaking rehabilitative
efforts. 167 In order to meet this prong, the agencies have required
proof that no one else would purchase the productive assets and
keep them in the market. 6 8 Additionally, rehabilitative efforts may
indicate a willingness to restore the failing division absent the
163. Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 137 (1969) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co.
v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291,302 (1930)); see, e.g., Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh,
868 F.2d 1285, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Citizen Publ'g Co., 394 U.S. at 137); United
States v. Md. and Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799,808 (D.D.C. 1958) (finding the
defendant "hopelessly insolvent and ... deeply in debt ... [andi] in fact on the brink of
bankruptcy-).
164. Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1288 (quoting Citizen Publ'g Co., 394 U.S. at 137).
165. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2.
166. Id.
167. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814,817 (2d Cir. 1979).
In F. & M. Schaefer Corp., the court found that the assets of Schmidt would not exit the
market absent the stock acquisition by Schaefer, considering that the company had recently
implemented rehabilitation measures and "enjoyled] the continued support of its creditors."
Id. at 817.
168. See In re Olin Corp., 113 F.T.C. 400, 618 (1990).
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acquisition, instead of an intention to shut down the division and
sell the assets outside the relevant market as the Merger
Guidelines required.
169
3. Less-Anticompetitive Purchaser Prong
The third prong of the failing division defense requires that the
seller undertake a good faith effort to identify alternative pur-
chasers that present less severe anticompetitive effects. 70 The
District Court for the District of Columbia thoroughly considered
the "only alternative purchaser" prong in FTC v. Harbour Group
Investments.17' The Harbour Group court required that "the party
claiming entitlement to the defense [prove] that the acquiring
company is the 'only available purchaser.'"' 72 To meet this standard,
the court held that companies must broadly disseminate infor-
mation about the pending sale in order to solicit potential buyers. '73
Although the court found that a merging party is not obligated to
hire a broker, it considered the failure to do so as evidence of a lack
of diligence in the search for an alternative purchaser.'74 Finally,
the court considered that the search for alternative purchasers did
not begin until after the acquisition deal was close to finalization,
suggesting that the search was "not designed to result in serious
alternatives."'
Depending on the facts in a given case, the District of Columbia
Circuit may also look to the various additional obligations imposed
in other circuits on parties trying to meet this prong of the defense.
Some other courts have required the parties to contact smaller
169. See F. & M. Schaefer Corp., 597 F.2d at 817.
170. 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, §§ 5.1, 5.2.
171. No. CIV.A-90-2525, 1990 WL 198819, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1990).
172. Id. at *3 (quoting Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138 (1969)).
173. Id. at *5.
174. Id. at *4 (noting this failure represented a "departure from the normal business
operations" and was characteristic ofthe company's perfunctory attempt to locate alternative
purchasers).
175. Id. at *6.
20031 457
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
competitors,176 while others required the good faith evaluation of
incoming offers.1
77
B. Counterbalancing Social Harm Against Anticompetitive Effects
Step two of the Modified Strict Adherence approach allows courts
to weigh overriding social harm that may result from blocking a
proposed acquisition-only after the court has considered the three-
prong failing division defense from the Merger Guidelines-
allowing courts "to determine whether the public interest could be
served by a preliminary injunction" blocking the merger. 178
Although consideration of social harm is necessarily fact specific,
the court should consider the harm to employees, stockholders,
creditors, and the surrounding community of the failing division if
a preliminary injunction blocks the merger.'79 The Supreme Court
originally considered these factors in justifying the failing com-
pany defense in International Shoe. is° Courts, however, are not
limited to considering only the International Shoe factors. Since
International Shoe, other courts have considered the fact that the
acquisition will promote both foreign trade and long-term benefits
to competition, such as the promotion of new entry into the market
and increase of research and development efforts in the industry.'8 1
176. United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 556 (1971) ("Moreover,
only King and Greater Buffalo were considered as prospective purchasers; the numerous
other smaller color comic supplement printers were never even approached.").
177. United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 781-82 (D. Md. 1976)
(holding that this prong was not met when a failing company failed to solicit bids, refused
negotiations with alternative purchasers, and effectively precluded consideration of any
company other than the purchaser).
178. See FTC v. Great Lakes Chem. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 84,98 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (approving
the acquisition of a failing division and finding that "significant public and private equities
favor consummation of the proposed acquisition').
179. See Intl Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
180. See id. International Shoe was cited by Congress with approval in passing the 1950
Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act, further suggesting that the Clayton Act
should not apply when overriding social harm would result. See supra notes 66-71 and
accompanying text.
181. For the application of these various factors, see, for example, Great Lakes Chem.
Corp., 528 F. Supp. at 98 (applying these factors to the sale of a failing division).
458 [Vol. 45:429
SURVIVING THE SHIPWRECK
C. Benefits of the Modified Strict Adherence Approach
The agencies' and courts' current treatment of the failing division
defense is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust policy-namely
protecting competition, increasing certainty, and providing ade-
quate flexibility." 2 Often the agencies exercise prosecutorial
discretion and decide not to challenge the merger. Although
sometimes the agencies will consider the failing division defense,
merging parties have no opportunity to argue the defense on
review by the courts. The courts have either applied another
defense entirely (the failing company defense), applied the General
Dynamics analysis to find that the merger is not prima facie
anticompetitive, or addressed the failing division defense, but
decided the case on other grounds.
The Modified Strict Adherence approach provides a two-step
framework in which to apply the failing division defense. Through
strict application of the defense by the agencies in step one and the
possible consideration of social harms by courts in step two, the
Modified Strict Adherence approach better achieves the goals of
antitrust policy than the various current treatments of the failing
division defense. The Modified Strict Adherence approach protects
competition, increases certainty in a complex area of legal practice,
and provides for flexibility to prevent inequity.
1. Protection of Competition
The protection of competition is the central goal of antitrust
policy."s So, how can a defense which permits a merger that is, by
definition, anticompetitive be reconciled with Section 7 of the
Clayton Act which prohibits such acquisitions? Some commentators
suggest that it cannot."" The Modified Strict Adherence approach
182. For discussion of the various treatment ofmergers involving failing divisional assets,
see discussion supra Parts I, II. For discussion of how the Modified Strict Adherence
approach to such mergers achieves these goals, see supra Part IV.B.
183. See AM. BAR ASS'N, supra note 157, at 5 (noting that "the central objective of the
antitrust laws is to protect the competitive enterprise system") (citations omitted).
184. Detailed analysis of the economic justifications of the failing division defense,
although extremely interesting and worthy of further consideration, is beyond the scope of
this Note. Many commentators have written about the economic justifications, or lack
thereof, of the failing division and failing company defenses. For arguments that the failing
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protects competition in three ways: by allowing mergers that
enhance competition, by providing a forum in which non-economic,
pro-competitive factors may be considered, and by enhancing the
agencies' role as the federal antitrust law enforcers.
A merger which results in increased market concentration
through the acquisition of a failing firm or division is anticompet-
itive, by definition."S Defining competition solely in terms of post-
acquisition market share, however, does not take into account the
impact on market share that may occur if the merger is blocked.
Thomas Campbell suggested that those who argue that the failing
division defense cannot be reconciled with Section 7 "have not
considered the other side of the balance-the consequence of letting
a firm simply leave the industry." 8'
The proper measurement of the anticompetitive effect of a
proposed acquisition is whether the merger is anticompetitive
compared to the market after the assets of the failing division exit,
because the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense requires a
finding that the assets in question would otherwise exit the market
absent the acquisition. 18 7 Maintaining a failing division's productive
assets as a discrete unit, even in the hands of a competitor, can
defenses are economically sound, see, for example, Campbell, Efficiency, supra note 64, at
252 (arguing that "it can be shown that the failing company defense is consistent with
economic efficiency"); Friedman, supra note 13, at 1378 (noting that in some cases the
defense makes economic sense). For arguments that the failing defenses are not economically
sound, see, for example, Paul M. Laurenza, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Failing
Company: An Updated Perspective, 65 VA. L. REV. 947, 951, 961 (1979); Robert Pitofsky,
Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J.
195, 231 (1992) (noting that the argument of an economic rationale for the failing firm
defense is "almost certainly wrong"); John Karl Bouman, Comment, The Impact of the
"Failing Company' Doctrine in the Federal Trade Commission's Premerger Clearance
Program, 19 SYRAcusE L. REv. 911, 916 (1968); Richard M. Dooley, Comment, Failing
Company Doctrine:Recent Developments, 47 TEK L. REV. 1437,1439 (1969); Roger B. Kaplan,
Note, All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: The Failing Company Doctrine as a
Conditional Defense to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 643, 645,683 (1976);
Paredes, supra note 136, at 349-50 (arguing that the failing fi-m defense is founded on
"rationales that are inconsistent with promoting competition"); Philip Sotiroff, Comment, An
Updating of the 'Failing Company"Doctrine in the Amended Section 7 Setting, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 566, 577-78 (1963) (outlining many anticompetitive effects that could result from
allowing a merger under the failing firm doctrine).
185. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
186. Campbell, Efficiency, supra note 64, at 257.
187. See 1992f1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § 5.2.
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significantly benefit competition. Economic theory suggests that
"the acquisition of a failing firm, even by a dominant firm, is
preferable to allowing the firm to fail financially and exit, since
acquisition keeps capacity in the market."188 When the failing
company analysis is applied to situations where the result, absent
the acquisition, would be the exit of the productive assets from the
relevant market, allowing the acquisition is a better result for
competition than letting the firm fail.1 89
Competitive impacts should not be defined solely in terms of
market share. Step two of the Modified Strict Adherence approach
benefits facets of competition other than market share, such as jobs
and branding, by allowing the court to look beyond market share
statistics and consider broader social concerns. First, allowing
the sale of a division as a going concern rather than awaiting its
exit preserves jobs if the acquirer maintains current division
operations. 90 Second, selling the assets as a unit minimizes
damage to competition by protecting non-productive assets such as
reputation and brand name.' Finally, competition suffers when
companies are forced to sink money into the maintenance of a
failing division instead of being permitted to sell it.' 92 By allowing
the sale of a division within the relevant market, the parent firm
may be able to realize a higher selling price rather than allowing
the division to fail and then auctioning off its remains piecemeal.' 93
Finally, the application of the failing division defense can benefit
competition by lending legitimacy to the role of the agencies as the
primary federal antitrust enforcers. The FTC and the DOJ are the
188. Paredes, supra note 136, at 363 n.58.
189. Id.
190. Cf Timothy B. Wathall, The Failing Company Defense and Corporate Collapse:
Probing for a Rational Approach to Business Failure, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 51, 68 (1982)
(pointing out that jobs are preserved if the acquiring entity is "committed to continue
operation in the same locale").
191. Cf Kurt Badenhausen, Brandwagon, FORBES, June 12, 2000, at 60 (noting that
"intangibles are everything" in competition).
192. See Campbell, Efficiency, supra note 64, at 255 (noting that failure to allow mergers
under the failing division defense would force companies to continue operating failing
divisions at a loss).
193. See J. Bradley Johnston, The Bankruptcy Bargain, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213,240 (1991)
(noting that the sale of a division as a going concern generally results in a greater aggregate
profit to a company than a piecemeal sale).
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two federal agencies primarily charged with enforcing the federal
antitrust laws. 194 Instead of applying the failing division defense
when raised by the parties, the agencies frequently decide not to
challenge the acquisition through the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion.' 5 Although prosecutional discretion may conserve
judicial resources and maintain the confidentiality of HSR Act
filings by merging parties, the current use of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in the context of failing division merger analysis is
particularly harmful to the legitimacy of the enforcement agencies.
First, by using prosecutorial discretion, the agencies are essentially
allowing the consummation of an otherwise anticompetitive merger
in violation of Section 7 without the procedural and evidentiary
safeguards of the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense."9
Second, failure to apply the strict Merger Guidelines' test in favor
of dismissal on prosecutorial discretion grounds creates decisions
that appear arbitrary.197 Although the agencies may exercise
prosecutorial discretion to prevent social harms that may result if
a proposed merger is blocked, their role is the enforcement of
antitrust policy, not social policy."9 s The agencies subject them-
selves to continuing scrutiny when they are sidetracked from the
protection of competition.'"
194. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
195. See supra Part I.C.
196. See Greaney, supra note 54, at 198 n.61.
197. Joe Sims, A New Approach to the Analysis of Hospital Mergers, 64 ANTITRUST L.J.
633, 636 (1996) (explaining that "while the exercise of intelligent prosecutorial discretion is
always welcome, from the outside the decisional standards are opaque and decisions can
appear arbitrary").
198. Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust, Competitiveness, and the World Arena: Efficiencies and
Failing Firms in Perspective, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 733 (1996) ("Jobs problems should be
dealt with by jobs policy ... competition policy should be dealt with by antitrust.").
199. Cf William E. Kovacic,EvaluatingAntitrustExperiments: UsingExPostAssessments
of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
843, 860-61 (2001) (suggesting that the legitimacy of enforcement policies rests with the
agencies' ability to assure economic efficacy of their chosen enforcement methods).
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2. Certainty
In addition to protecting competition, certainty is also crucial to
effective antitrust enforcement.2" In issuing the joint 1992 Merger
Guidelines, the FTC and DOJ indicated their intention to increase
certainty in the merger review process by providing a roadmap for
the agencies' evaluation of mergers.20 ' Certainty is necessary in
merger review for several reasons. First, it is extremely valuable to
merging parties. 20 2 "Mergers are time-sensitive transactions, and
the potential duration and uncertainty of a court battle is often
enough to dissuade all but the most ardent firms from completing
a deal."203 Second, strict adherence to guidelines will "substantially
reduce the possibility that the agencies will challenge a proposed
transaction that is unlikely to injure competition."2 4 Dealmakers
praised the 1992 Merger Guidelines, which included the current
failing division defense, as a clear and concise vehicle for enhancing
competition.0 5
Clear and concise Merger Guidelines alone are insufficient to
lend certainty to the merger review process; strict adherence to the
Merger Guidelines is necessary. The Merger Guidelines are
worthless if the merging parties are unable to rely on them for
guidance in the dealmaking process. 20 6 Although there may be
decreased certainty at the stage of court review as a result of
200. Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
71 CAL. L. REV. 1582, 1695 (1983) ("[Ainy antitrust enforcement system must, above all, be
as objective and predictable as possible.").
201. See 1992/1997 Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, § .0. ("By stating its policy as simply
and clearly as possible, the Agency hopes to reduce the uncertainty associated with
enforcement of the antitrust laws in this area."); see also Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, at 500 (noting that the 1982 Merger Guidelines were born
out of a "persistent quest ... for certainty").
202. See James F. Rill, An Antitrust Screen for Merger Masters of the 1990s, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, SeptJOct. 1992, at 52-54.
203. Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach to Merger
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 47 (1995).
204. Rill, supra note 202, at 53 (noting that the 1992 Merger Guidelines "will prove to be
an extremely valuable resource for dealmakers").
205. See id.
206. Cf Sims & Blumenthal, supra note 10, at 17 (noting that the increased certainty
provided by the 1982 Merger Guidelines could be eroded by the use of prosecutorial
discretion and judgment calls).
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court consideration of social harms, the Modified Strict Adherence
approach will increase certainty overall by first applying the
Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. The current treatment
of the failing division defense is replete with uncertainty.o7 Prior to
agency review, merging parties do not know whether their merger
will be subject to strict scrutiny or, conversely, whether it will not
be subject to scrutiny at all if the agency exercises prosecutorial
discretion and does not challenge the acquisition.2 "8 Courts further
compound the uncertainty in the merger review process because
they have not accepted the failing division defense. 209 Rather, courts
decide merger cases based on the failing company defense or the
General Dynamics analysis. 210 Considering these varied approaches,
the only certainty regarding the failing division defense in the
current merger review process is that merging parties cannot rely
on the Merger Guidelines' failing division defense. The Modified
Strict Adherence approach requires both agencies and courts to
consider the failing division defense as outlined by the Merger
Guidelines. This approach solves the uncertainty of the current
system by providing a unified analysis on which merging parties
can rely for guidance in the dealmaking process.
3. Flexibility
A new approach to the failing division defense should also
provide flexibility,2 because strict Merger Guidelines analysis may
not reflect the true competitive impact of a proposed merger.212
Consider a merger in which a division meets only two out of the
three requirements of Merger Guidelines' test: it has negative
operating cash flow and has adequately shown that its assets will
exit the market if the acquisition is blocked, but did not show that
207. See Kauper, The 1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 37, at 525-31.
208. See supra Part I.C.2.
209. See supra Part II.
210. See supra Parts II.A-B.
211. See AM. BAR Ass N, supra note 157, at 5.
212. See Campbell, Efficiency, supra note 64, at 256 ("ITihe confining rigor of structural
analysis in merger law ... leaves out much that is important with regard to life as it is lived
in the market place.") (quoting L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 204(g)
(1977)).
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it made sufficient efforts to find a less-anticompetitive alternative
purchaser. Assume that no less-anticompetitive purchaser ac-
tually exists, such that the company's sufficient efforts to locate
alternative purchasers would have been futile. Strict Merger
Guidelines analysis dictates blocking this merger. The Modified
Strict Adherence approach provides the requisite flexibility in step
two to allow the consummation of this merger if overriding social
harms, such as harm to stockholders, employees, and the
surrounding community, would result absent the merger.
The consideration of non-economic factors is not new to antitrust
law and policy. The 1950 Celler-Kefauver Amendments to sections
7 and 10 of the Clayton Act, in quoting the language of
International Shoe, endorsed the Court's view that antitrust policy
should be concerned with non-quantifiable harms such as the
harms to stockholders, creditors, and the surrounding community
that would occur absent a proposed merger.213 Opponents of the
failing division defense point to the statutory language of Section 7,
noting that Section 7 is only concerned with mergers that sub-
stantially lessen competition,214 and does not mention social
concerns.15 Prior to becoming FTC Chairman, Robert Pitofsky
addressed this opposition, noting that although balancing of social
considerations will mitigate the "tidy world of exclusively micro-
economic analysis," failure to take into account such impacts of a
proposed merger "would be unresponsive to the will of Congress."2"6
During step two of the Modified Strict Adherence approach, a
court should consider the harm to employees, stockholders, cred-
itors, the surrounding community of the failing division, and any
other social harms that may result if a preliminary injunction
blocks the acquisition.217 Ultimately, weighing these factors against
the anticompetitive impact of a proposed merger is necessary to
ensure that the enforcement agencies do not cause substantial
social harm simply because at the time of the merger the company
213. S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 7 (1950), reprinted in 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERALANTITRUSTLAWSAND RELATEDSTATUTES 3521,3525-26 (Earl W. Kintner ed. 1980).
214. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
215. See Cann, supra note 34, at 284.
216. Pitofsky, supra note 157, at 1052.
217. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930).
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failed part of a rigid analysis. These considerations provide ade-
quate flexibility to restore the original intention of the courts and
legislature not to apply Section 7 when overriding social harm
would result, and prevents harm to competition that may result
from a per se approach to the Merger Guidelines' failing division
defense.1i
Because very few merger cases go to court,21 9 and even fewer of
those involve the failing division defense, consideration of social
harm in merger cases may be rare. One reason that the failing
division defense is rarely litigated in court is because attorneys are
often unwilling to risk asserting a defense that the courts have
historically disfavored.220 Increasing acceptance of the failing
division defense in the courts will likely result in more cases raising
it as an issue in the near future, providing the litigants with an
opportunity to argue that overriding social harms would result if
their proposed acquisition is blocked.
Some commentators on the failing company defense have
suggested incorporating social factors into the merger review
analysis at the agency level." 1 Consideration of social factors by
antitrust enforcement agencies is inadvisable. First, the agencies
are experts in antitrust policy, not social policy. 222 Because of their
lack of expertise developing social policy, agency balancing of social
concerns is an inefficient use of the agencies' limited resources.22
Second, consideration of fluid factors, such as social harm, can
create avenues for political and interest group influences and result
218. See supra Part V.B.
219. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 13, at 1379 (expressing that'[h]ardship concerns may
play a role in the enforcement officials' decision whether to act against a particular merger,
but they are inappropriate for judicial consideration"); Marina Lao, Mergers in a Declining
Defense Industry: Should the Merger Guidelines be Reassessed?, 28 CONN. L. REv. 347,381-83
(1996) (advocating that agencies should consider risks to national security when evaluating
mergers involving the defense industry).
222. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
223. See Federal Trade Commission, Fiscal Year 2002 Congressional Justification Budget
Summary, available at http./Aww.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsum2002.htm (last visited Apr.
15, 2003) (explaining that despite the decrease in HSR filings due to the recently increased
threshold levels, the dollar value of mergers investigated by the agency increased sixty-three
percent over the prior year, indicating a trend toward increasingly complex merger review).
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in the appearance, if not reality, of arbitrary antitrust enforcement
decisions. Recent events demonstrate that the FTC and DOJ are
easily swayed by outside pressure from politicians and the legal
community. For example, buckling under Congressional pressure,
in 2002, the DOJ withdrew from an agreement with the FTC
regarding clearance procedures,22' which divided enforcement areas
between the agencies and effectively prevented clearance disputes
over which agency would investigate a given merger."
Step two of the Modified Strict Adherence approach allows
limited consideration of social harms by the courts, while pre-
venting the harm that can arise from agency consideration. Courts
are more sheltered from political pressures than agencies and are
better equipped to make decisions of social policy. Additionally,
courts frequently balance social considerations in other contexts,
including the failing company defense, enabling them to better see
a "big picture" of merger analysis not available to agency officials
who are primarily concerned with increases in market power.226
CONCLUSION
After nineteen years in the Merger Guidelines, it is time to
reconsider the failing division defense. Despite acquiescence in the
courts and disparate treatment by the antitrust enforcement
agencies, justification exists for the increased application of the
failing division defense in the context of merger review under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. This Note proposes a Modified Strict
Adherence approach to the failing division defense involving two
224. For more information on the clearance process, see THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS,
supra note 1, at 26.
225. See, e.g., Brent Shearer, Merger Clearance Accord Turns Nasty, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, June 1, 2002, LEXIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Journal File; see also James
R. Weiss & Martin L. Stem, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the FCC and the
Justice Department Over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 195,
199-200 (1998) (noting that the DOJ, although historically less susceptible to political
pressure, has recently faced increased Congressional scrutiny). But see William J. Baer &
David A. Balto, Public Choice: Do Politics Corrupt Antitrust Enforcement? The Politics of
Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 125 (1999) (claiming that
antitrust enforcement agencies are more susceptible to political pressure because their
decisions are increasingly transparent).
226. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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steps of analysis. In step one, enforcement agencies strictly
construe the Merger Guidelines' three-part failing division defense.
In step two, after first applying the Merger Guidelines' failing
division defense, courts may weigh social harms against the
anticompetitive impact of the merger and balance the equities of
the acquisition. Application of the Modified Strict Adherence
approach to the failing division defense will protect competition,
increase certainty in an increasingly complex area of legal practice,
and provide for flexibility in fact-specific inquiries. The failing
division defense is one shipwreck worthy of reclamation.
Amanda L. Wait
